whole, to being independent nations left to find their own place in the global 23 economic system. The situation of these nations since the dissolution of the Soviet 24 Union provides a rare experiment, in which we might observe the influence of the 25 1 Historically the MFA approach used for this study was one of two systems employed to organize environmental accounts at the national and international scale and in accordance with economic accounts. MFA was largely promoted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Haberl et al. 2004 ) and is essentially a flow account of natural resources. The complement is the System of Economic and Environmental Accounts (SEEA) of the United Nations (Bartelmus 2007 ) which focuses on stock changes in natural resources and built assets. For MFA the science and policy community has reached broad agreement on the methodologies to be employed (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011 ) and more recently MFA has become an integrated part of the SEEA c.f European Commission et al. (2012) .
Methods used to establish material flow accounts have become been increasingly 14 standardized in recent years, to facilitate inter-country and inter-regional 15 comparisons. Both the methods and the underlying base data sets used to prepare 16 the EW-MFA accounts for the EECCA region were essentially identical to those 17 employed previously to assemble the database used in West and Schandl"s (2013) 18 analysis of material flows in Latin America and the Caribbean. The reader is thus 19 referred to the methods and data sources section of that paper for a good summary 20 of the database synthesis methods used here. Alternatively, a highly detailed 21 account of the procedures used is contained in the the Technical Annex on EECCA 22
MFA Database, attached as supporting information to this paper. 23
24
To analyse the drivers of material use, a variant of the Impact = Population x 25 Affluence x Technology (IPAT) framework is used. The method used is again 26 identical to that employed in West and Schandl (2013) , to which the reader is also 1 referred for a brief description, and further onward references if required. 2 
3
The GDP measure used throughout this study was exchange rate based constant 4 year 2000 $US, sourced from (World Bank 2012). We prefer to use exchange rate 5 based GDP rather than PPP for assessing resource efficiency as it emphasises the 6 international value placed on the economic activity, rather than the ability to 7 consume locally. Exchange rate based measures also remain stable over time in 8 relative terms, regardless of whether the base year used, in contrast to PPP 9 measures, where countries can undergo major retrospective changes in relative 10 GDP as the PPP methodology used is periodically updated. decreased from 10.5% to 5.6% over the period. Material flows for the region are 21 best discussed after subdividing the time series data into two periods, the 22 immediate post-Soviet era contraction, and the period of expansion which began in 23 the late 1990s. From almost 4.5 billion tonnes in 1992, DMC fell rapidly to just 2.6 24 billion tonnes at its low point in 1998, and then began to increase steadily to 4.0 25 billion tonnes by 2008, a contraction of some 12% when taken over the full period. 1 This compares to total growth for the rest of the world of 74% over the same 2 period, a compounding annual growth rate of 3.5%. Given EECCA region"s small contraction having a disproportionate effect on those sectors most reliant on 5 internal demand, while demand remained strong in export oriented sectors. 6
Construction materials, for example, decreased 63% between 1992 and 1997, while 7 fossil fuels, and metal ores and industrial minerals decreased by only 24% and 20% 8 respectively on 1992 levels. 9
It is noteworthy that Figure 3 indicates relative shares of the different major 10 categories of materials remained broadly consistent when materials demand re-11 expanded. This differs from the pattern typically observed when countries 12 experience a rapid expansion in DMC per capita as a result of transitioning from 13 biomass-based advanced agrarian societies, to mineral and fossil fuel-based 14 industrial societies. The classic socio-metabolic transition, described in Fischer- The degree of consistency in the relative shares of different material categories at 3 the beginning and end of the period is interesting, in that it does not indicate any 4 large-scale "reprimarization" of the region over the post-Soviet period 3 . This is 5 despite the large-scale rationalization of state-owned manufacturing which 6 occurred over the period. As discussed later, this perhaps unexpected outcome may 7 just indicate a need to analyse EW-MFA measures at a higher level of resolution, 8
and also take materials efficiency gains into account. while the total consumption of fossil fuels in the Asia-Pacific increased by roughly 10 2.3 billion tonnes. This complementarity echoes that described in West and 11
Schandl (2013) regarding the expansion of metal ores production in Latin America, 12
and rapid growth in metal ores demand from the Asia-Pacific region. 13
14
One factor which should be taken into account when interpreting PTB and DMC 15 trajectories over time is that different categories of primary materials undergo very 16 different degrees of concentration between initial extraction from the environment, 17 and the form in which they are typically traded as crude commodities. The 18 importance of this issue is described in detail in Schandl and West (2012) .The main 19 point is that the resources apparently "consumed" by an economy, as measured by 20 DMC, will vary greatly depending on the type of commodities the economy uses, 21 and the stage of the processing at which they are exported. Most importantly, 22 apparent consumption measured by DMC can have little relationship to the point of 23 final use 6 . This is especially so for some major classes of metal ores and biomass, 24
where DMC may appear an order of magnitude or more higher in the extracting 1 economy than it does for the economy where the concentrated metal or biomass 2 product is finally used. This effect is further illustrated in a recent study by where MI was largely static when averaged over the full period, and has been 9 deteriorating since 2000. This achievement at the regional level might in part 10 reflect one-off opportunities available to increase efficiencies in economies which 11 may have started the period with considerable negative value-adding 7 
in major 12
industrial sectors (Thornton 1996 , Simon 1996 . Despite the rapid improvement in 
Material Use Trends in Three Selected Economies 21
In this section we concentrate on the changes seen at the individual national level 23 for a selection of three successor states. At this level, we would expect the different 24 7 Negative value adding refers to the situation where the value of the inputs and components used in a production process are worth more than the resulting final product. natural endowments of each state to affect their development paths, as they were 1 forced to function as individual states in a globalized economy, rather than as 2 constituent states in the integrated economic whole that was the Soviet Union. 3
4
The largest successor state, Russia, was not selected for individual study because it 5
is sufficiently large a component of the region that its profile is broadly similar to 6 that described for the region as a whole 8 . The three states selected were 7
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. These three nations encompass a range of 8 very different material flows profiles. Using the six-type country classification set 9 out by Krausmann et al. (2008) , used as guidance to a country"s socio-metabolic 10 profile, three country typologies are covered: low population density industrial 11 countries of the Old World (Kazakhstan) , and high population density industrial 12 countries of the Old World (Ukraine), and high population density developing 13 countries (Tajikistan) 9 . For this study it is further asserted that Kazakhstan has high 14 relative natural resource endowment, Ukraine a high to moderate endowment, and 15
Tajikistan very low endowment. The justification for this is provided in the 16 supporting information S1. 17
In Figure 7 we see that there are great disparities in affluence (GDP per-capita) 18 between the selected states, and that these disparities increased over the period 19 studied. Of the three, all began the period poorer than the EECCA average of 20 $1,560, marginally so in the case of Kazakhstan and significantly so in the case of 21
Ukraine. Tajikistan was very poor, at around 17% of the regional average and 22 broadly comparable to nations such as Sudan and Bangladesh at that time. Of the 23 8 Russia accounted for 59% of regional total DMC in 2008.
9 If we took the aggregated status of the USSR as the starting point, then all successor states would be classified as "industrial", however the DMC profile of Tajikistan at the beginning of the study period has biomass-to-mineral ratios more typical of an advanced agrarian society rather than an industrial one. This reclassification is further warranted by Tajikistan"s very low GDP per capita. The overall magnitude of DMC per capita and the relative shares of different 10 categories for Kazakhstan are consistent with the socio-metabolic regime of an 11 industrialized county, but its PTB indicates that it is becoming increasingly reliant 12 on exports of fossil fuels in particular. This latter may be significant when we 13 consider the relatively good performance of Kazakhstan in improving its MI. As 14 most of the mass of fossil fuels is still embodied in the form in which they are 15 extracted (Schandl and West 2012 ), very little of the fossils fuels extracted and 16 exported afterwards will show on a countries DMC account, while all of the 17 income generated will show in GDP, boosting apparent MI. It is thus likely that 18 much of Kazakhstan"s early improvements in MI and growth in GDP accrued from 19 simply diverting fossil fuels previously used in relatively inefficient domestic 20 industries to export markets, while strong increases in fossil fuel prices from 21 around 2002 on would have boosted performance in the latter years. 22 <Insert Figure 9 around here> Tajikistan"s DMC per capita and PTB per capita are shown in figure 10 , and forms 1 a stark contrast with that for Kazakhstan. Tajikistan"s DMC per capita was the 2 lowest for any of the three focus countries, finishing the period at 2.8 tonnes per 3 capita. Tajikistan was not a significant net exporter of any major material category 4 in any year, and heavily reliant on imports for its fossil fuel requirements. This lack 5 of significant exports and associated foreign exchange income may explain the 6 severity of the contraction in fossil fuel usage seen, as Tajikistan was exposed to 7 market prices for imports. Fossil fuel consumption remained suppressed in 8 subsequent years, at one third of 1992 levels in 2008. This contrasts with biomass, 9 which had returned to 1992 levels by 2008 in absolute terms, and had greatly 10 increased its relative share from 60% to 80%. Non-zero fuel wood is recorded for 11
Tajikistan"s in FAO (2011a) for the first time in 2004, perhaps reflecting increasing 12 substitution for expensive imported fossil fuels, however this accounted for less 13 than 1% total biomass. While DMC of biomass returned to pre-contraction levels, 14 Tajikistan. This may reflect a better ability to pay for continued imports of fossil 14 fuels relative to Tajikistan, supported by growth in its other materials exports, and 15 also a limited ability to substitute locally produced fossil fuels (notably coal) for 16 imports. The PTB panel appears consistent with this, in that net fossil fuel imports 17 per capita remained relatively stable after the initial contraction, while fairly 18 consistent growth in net exports for all other categories continued over the post-19 contraction period 11 . 20
Of the four categories of DMC, only biomass showed a marginal increase in 21 tonnage per capita over the period, however as all other categories decreased, this 22 translated into a major expansion in biomass" share of total DMC, from 26% in 23 1992 to 38% in 2008. The DMC pattern for Ukraine is thus one which might 24 indicate a country becoming less industrialized, with a higher proportion of its DE 1 apparently being exported at an earlier stage in the value-adding chain. This 2 indicates that less is being retained locally in infrastructure, and/or less is being 3 transformed into more elaborately transformed manufactured goods for export or 4 local consumption. The DMC of fossil fuels remained at levels typical of 5 industrialized countries even after strong decreases in the post-Soviet contraction. 6
It may be that the earlier high levels resulted from low or negative value-adding 7 activity, so the apparent de-industrialization may just reflect the improvement in 8 material productivity that we know (from Figure 8) has taken place. 
Drivers of material use 13 14
To analyse the drivers of material use, we apply here a variant of the IPAT 15 framework proposed in Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) . The implementation is 16 identical to that outlined in West and Schandl (2013) . 17 Table 1 shows changes in the drivers over the full study period for the three focus 19 countries and the region as a whole. There are a couple of features of this study 20 which contrast it with previous comparable studies for the Asia-Pacific (Schandl 21 and West 2010) and Latin American (West and Schandl) . Firstly, the population of 22 the EECCA region as a whole contracted over time, and so ceteris paribus, would 23 act to moderate environmental impacts over time. The second difference is that 24 total DMC decreased over the study period as a whole, and so care must be taken 25 in interpreting the figures given below e.g. where we see that A contributed 41% 26 to the change in I for 1992-1998, this means that it acted to reduce DMC over that 1 time, while for the period 1998 -2008, its contribution of 224% acted to increase 2
DMC. 3 4
For all three focus countries over the period 1992 -1998 we can see that all 5 became less affluent, and this acted to drive DMC lower, with this poverty effect 6 most pronounced in Tajikistan. Similarly, as well as becoming poorer, all three 7 countries became more efficient at generating GDP per tonne of material used. 8
This also acted to drive DMC lower. Finally, Ukraine and Kazakhstan both 9 experience population contractions, which further suppressed DMC. We see that 10 over the post-Soviet era contraction period, increasing poverty was the strongest 11 driver of decreases in DMC for the region as a whole, and for two out of the three 12 focus countries. 13
14
During the period 1998-2008, we see that moderate to very strong improvements T 15 continued, and acted as strong restraints on growth in DMC through this re-16 expansionary period. On the other hand, affluence increased strongly over the 17 period, and was by far the strongest driver of increasing DMC for all focus 18 countries and for the region as a whole. Population increased in two of the three 19 focus countries, so driving DMC higher there, but in all cases except Tajikistan, 20 the effect of population change was minor compared to the effects of A and T. 21 22 <Insert Table 1 around here>   23   24 
General discussion and conclusions 25 1
The EECCA region appears to have provided a unique experiment in how the 2 natural endowments of nations and their initial economic structure can affect their 3 development paths when suddenly exposed to global market forces. The insights 4 resulting from this study extend and expand on previous analysis done for some 5 non-Soviet of Eastern European economies e.g. for the Czech Republic, Hungary 6
and Poland in Kovanda and Hak (2008) . 7 8 Perhaps the clearest theme that can be identified from the post-Soviet MFA and 9 material efficiency trends examined here is that EECCA was a region apart when it 10 comes to both the initial inefficiency with which it employed natural resources to 11 generate GDP, and that it has also since experienced improvements and (relative) 12 dematerialization with an intensity not seen elsewhere. Despite these massive 13 improvements in material efficiency, there would still appear to be room for major 14 further improvements, as regional MI remains nearly four times World average 15 levels, and over twice that of highly resource intensive regions such as Latin 16 America. Perhaps surprisingly, it may be that the path to a more resource efficient 17 future for some nations will pass, at least temporarily, through a period of serving 18 increasingly as suppliers of natural resources to external economies. This is exactly 19 what appears to be happening in economies such as Kazakhstan. Even if this is so, 20 the special starting conditions of the region, (specifically, the widespread existence 21 of negative value adding activities) cautions against reading too much into this. with its rich endowment of mineral wealth and lack of any significant import 5 dependence from the outset, quickly found ready markets for its products in the 6 global economy, and has outperformed economically. Tajikistan, in common with 7 many high population density countries, had little natural wealth to call on, and its 8 DMC profile in 1992 indicates that it began the period with an economic structure 9 similar to the poorest agrarian societies. Its economic / development status at the 10 end of the period, judged by GDP and DMC profile, was worse than in 1992, (but 11 was improving). Ukraine"s starting position appears much closer to Kazakhstan 12 than Tajikistan, although it began the period dependent on considerable fossil fuel 13 imports, and remained so. Its DMC profile in 2008 indicated a less industrialized 14 society than in 1992, but improvements in material efficiency managed to restore 15 its GDP to 1992 levels, in effect achieving the same with much less. The lack of 16 any discernible impact of the GFC on Ukraine, compared to Kazakhstan and 17
Tajikistan, perhaps indicates a nation which is less integrated with those regions 18 most affected by the GFC. Given its position (closer to Western Europe, which was 19 heavily impacted by the GFC, and more distant from East Asia, which was 20 relatively unaffected) this is somewhat unexpected. Perhaps the Ukraine has 21 retained stronger links to the EECCA region as a whole, which demonstrated a 22 similar resilience to the GFC in 2008. Certainly at the time of writing the ability of 23 the Ukraine to act entirely politically independent from Russia appears to be 24
constrained. 25
In the course of this study, it also became apparent that the trajectory of resource 1 efficiencies following the abrupt dissolution of Soviet Union presented an 2 opportunity to look for the effects of improving material efficiency on economic 3 growth. Any clear manifestation of a positive link between increased material 4 efficiency and stronger economic growth is relevant to both the debate on whether 5 dematerialization is a net positive or negative for economic growth, and would also 6 provide support for some measure of rebound effect up to this result would be testing this relationship in detail at an international level, 16 using the comparable data sets prepared for the Asia-Pacific and for Latin America 17 and the Caribbean, and also extending it to see if there is an independent link 18 between DMC and improved resource efficiency (after controlling for affluence), 19 which is we would expect from rebound. At the time of writing, however, it was 20 thought that careful consideration needed to go into how any such extensions 21 should be conducted, to avoid descending into what could too easily become an 22 exercise in mining for correlations. Conducting and reporting on a systematic 23 investigation along these lines is intended as a next step. 24 12 Rebound effect is the tendency of efficiency gains to generate further demand, which in turn reduce the persistence of any initial reduction in materials or energy demand which resulted from the initial efficiency gains. A good review of the different types and degrees of rebound is contained in Jenkins et.al (2011) . That work deals with rebound as it applies to energy consumption, however the underlying principle should apply to materials consumption as well. Legend: I = DMC, P = population, A = GDP/capita and T = DMC/GDP 
